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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BENJAMIN N. RYAN, ) 
Third-Party Plaintiff - ) 
Respondent, 
-vs. -
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, 






NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for a judicial determination that third-party plaintiff 
was an insured person under the terms of third-party defendant's policy of 
liability insurance while driving the insured vehicle. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Honorable Bryant H. Croft, District Judge, granted third-party 
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, in so doing holding that third-party 
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plaintiff was an insured person under the terms of third-party defendant's policy 
of automobile liability insurance while driving the insured vehicle under the 
conditions which gave rise to this cause of action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have the Summary Judgment of the District 
Court affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the evening of December 22, 1972, Christopher Ryan, age 16, 
obtained the use of a 1969 Dodge Dart owned by his father, Earl F. Ryan, for 
the stated purpose of going out with some friends. At approximately 9:00 p. m., 
Christopher Ryan picked up Ronald Nez, age 18, Mike Edvalson, age 18, and 
third-party plaintiff Benjamin N. Ryan, age 18, (no relation). Christopher 
Ryan had permission from his father Earl F. Ryan to take the vehicle out for 
the evening as is shown by his affidavit in the form of a sworn statement which 
was taken by an insurance adjuster for third-party defendant Allstate in the 
presence of Earl F. Ryan shortly after the accident. The following appears 
in the sworn statement of Christopher Ryan, at page 4, line 3: 
Q. And at that time did you ask your father's permission 
to use the car ? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. Can you describe for me how you did it ? Can you 
describe what you said to him and what your father 
said to you when you asked him to use the car? Did 
he put any limitations on your use of the car? 
A. No. 
-2-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Q. (Mrs. Ryan): Well Christopher? 
A. He said be back by 1:00. 
Q. Did he say anything about who could drive the car? 
A. Yes, just me. 
And at page 4, line 15: 
Q. Did he say anything about where you could go or 
where you could not go ? 
A. No. 
Q. Did he put any limitations on you as to how far 
you could go, or anything like that? 
A. No, as long as I paid for the gas. 
At approximately midnight, the boys were at a bowling alley on South 
State Street and were preparing to leave for another bowling alley. At that 
time Benjamin N. Ryan asked if he could drive to the next bowling alley, and 
Christopher Ryan allowed him to do so. During the trip between the two bowling 
alleys, Benjamin Ryan was involved in an accident with another vehicle resulting 
in one death and serious injuries to an occupant of the other vehicle. Allstate 
Insurance Company denied coverage to Benjamin Ryan based upon the named 
insured9s restriction that no one but Christopher was to drive the car. 
The omnibus clause of the ^policy of liability insurance that was issued 
to Earl F. Ryan states as follows: nThe following persons are insured under 
this part:n 
1. The named insured with respect to the owned or nonowned 
automobile; 
2. Any resident of the named insured's household with respect 
to the owned automobile; 
3. Any other person with respect to the owned automobile 
provided the actual use thereof is with the permission of 
the named insured; 
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4. Any relative with respect to a nonowned private passenger 
automobile or trailer not regularly furnished for the use 
of such relative; and, 
5. Any other person or organization with respect to any 
automobile or trailer provided: 
(a) The actual use is by a person who is an insured 
under any of the four preceeding paragraphs, 
with respect to such automobile or trailer, and 
(b) Such other person or organization is legally 
responsible for the use and except with respect 
to a temporary substitute automobile does not 
own or hire the automobile or trailer. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PERMISSION GRANTED BY THE NAMED INSURED 
EARL F. RYAN, FOR USE OF THE INSURED AUTOMO-
BILE, ENCOMPASSED THE USE TO WHICH IT WAS BE-
ING PUT AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT, AND THUS 
BENJAMIN N. RYAN WAS COVERED UNDER THE PRO-
VISIONS OF THE OMNIBUS CLAUSE AT THE TIME OF 
THE ACCIDENT. 
It is generally held that although the named insured has prohibited 
the use of the vehicle by a third party, such prohibition shall not be held to 
preclude recovery under the omnibus dause where, (1) The original permittee 
is riding in the car with the second permittee at the time of the accident, or (2) 
The second permittee in using the vehicle is serving some purpose of the original 
permittee. The reasoning which the courts have adopted in arriving at these 
rulings is that the second permittee is, noperatingrr the car for the ,rusen of the 
first permittee and such "use" is within the coverage of the omnibus clause. 
4 ALR3d 68, Section 12(b). 
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The Honorable Judge Croft points out in his memorandum decision 
granting third-party plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment that an omnibus 
clause such as the one involved in the case at bar speaks in terms of the "use" 
of the vehicle, not its "operation. " As the Court states: "This provision of 
the policy does not limit coverage to only those persons who drive with the 
owner's permission but requires only that the use of the car be with the owner's 
permission. " In Allstate Insurance Company vs. Fidelity and Casualty Company, 
180 A2d 168 (N.J.), which presented a fact situation very similar to the instant 
case, the named insured knew that other young people would be in the vehicle 
and gave his son permission to use it to attend an evening basketball game. The 
named insured cautioned his son not to allow anyone else to drive; however, 
during a stop to pick up one of the passengers the son attempted to teach an 
unlicensed fifteen year-old companion how to operate the car and the companion 
lost control and struck a pedestrian. The court held that the named insured's 
injunction to his son against allowing anyone else to drive was not a significant 
factor and that the second permittee was entitled to coverage as an additional 
insured. The court further stated that the omnibus clause refers to the "use" 
of the car and not to its operation and that the original permittee's unrestricted 
permission to use the vehicle encompassed the very use to which he put it. In 
Loffler vs. Boston Insurance Company, 120 A2d 621 (D.C.), where the named 
insured's son with his father's permission obtained the car for use on a "date" 
but in violation of instructions permitted his date, an unlicensed operator, to 
drive, the court held that the car ivas still being used by the son for the very 
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purpose for which permission had been granted, namely for rtdatingn purposes. 
The court stated that if the insurer wished to avoid liability under such circum-
stances it should have inserted the word "operated" in the clause which provided 
coverage while the automobile was being "used" by the named insured or with 
his permission. And in National Farmers Union Property & Casualty Co. vs. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , (D. C. Mont) 277 F. Supp. 542, (applying 
Montana law), the court found the insurer liable even though the named insured 
had expressly forbidden his daughter to permit others to drive the car, where 
the accident occurred while the daughter's friend was driving with the daughter's 
permission, because the friend's vehicle was attached to a trailer used to 
transport the daughter's horse to a parade. The court found that the insured's 
permission was implied since the car was being driven for the purpose, benefit 
and advantage of his daughter. 
There is a substantial policy reason for construing the standard omnibus 
clause broadly in favor of the insured and injured. This is to effectuate the 
strong legislative policy of assuring financial protection for innocent victims of 
automobile accidents, reflected by statutory requirements in all states, including 
Utah, of adequate liability coverages for all vehicles operated on the highways. 
This policy underlies most of the decisions upholding coverage under circum-
stances such as these. For example, in Indemnity Insurance Company vs. 
Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Company, 166 A2d 355 (N.J.), the court 
made a broad construction for the purpose of effectuating the comprehensive 
scheme of the New Jersey Motor vehicle legislation, stating that the insurance 
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policy provision only called for permission to "r~rn —* ^r ' ; , operation'' 
of the vehulc and thai thu^c words were not synonymous /''*• toma1* hvhiti> 
broader in denoting the employment of the < m ; <. - /*•* purpose of the user 
while the latter referred io the manipulate 
Other courts which have afforded protection to the second permittee 
under the omnibus clause, even though the named insured had prohibited the 
original pei miiiee f? om allowii i g othei s io drive, have also done so when 
there was a finding that the first permittee was riding in the car or was bene-
Jiied h\ its ()/* lation In lUc sr< <md pa m*tt\ < , and the - • ; vhich it was being 
used was within the scope of the initial permission. Hanover Ins. Co., vs. 
Miesmer, 24 i) A'V.S 87\ |. Pollard vs. Safeco Ins. * ., •• *-' - ~vfl 
(Tenn); Brooks & Delta Fire & Casualty Co , 82 So, 2t;<J 5.f (La); Metcalf vs. 
Hartford Acci. & Indem. Co., 126 NW2d 471 (Nt >b); State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co. vs.. Williamson, 331 F.2d 517 (applying Ariz, law); Schneck vs. 
Mutual Service Casualty Ins. Co., 119 NW2d 342 (Wis); Allstate Ins. Co. vs. 
Nationwide Mut. hi^. Lu. » n71 A?d ?0l f1)cl)} Strickland vs. Georgia Casualty 
& Surety Co , 162 SE2d 421 (Ga); Mullin vs. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 136 
NW2d 612 (A linn); Uisintin vs. County Mutual lusurame Co, , 222 NE2d 550 
(III). 
use the vehicle for recreational purposes, which would include driving with his 
friends to various bowling alleys Ai M'/i iane oi iiiv m ulciti «ol' tmfy n I < 
original permittee a passenger in the vehicle, but the vehicle tvas also being 
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used for his benefit. Therefore, it is clear that the requirements for extending 
coverage to the second permittee were met; namely, (1) that the use to which 
the vehicle was being put was within the scope of the original permission, (2) 
that the first permittee was a passenger in the vehicle and (3) that the vehicle 
was being used for the benefit of the first permittee. 
POINT II 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ON FILE TO 
JUSTIFY THE LOWER COURT'S GRANT OF SUM-
MAR Y JUDGMENT ON THIS ISSUE. 
The only issue presented by this third-party action and the hearing 
of third-party plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment was whether third-
party defendant's liability insurance nomnibus11 clause covered third-party 
plaintiffs liability at the time of the accident which gave rise to this cause of 
action. The only evidence needed to decide this issue was on record at the 
time of the hearing. That evidence consisted of (I) a copy of the applicable 
policy provisions, (2) a sworn affidavit in the form of a statement given by 
Christopher Ryan, the son of the named insured, in the named insured's 
presence on December 28, 1972; and (3) the uncontroverted fact that the acci-
dent which gave rise to this cause of action occurred after Christopher Ryan 
obtained permission from his father to take the vehicle and while the vehicle 
was being operated by third-party plaintiff Benjamin N. Ryan with Christopher 
Ryan as passenger. 
-8-
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The affidavit submitted by opposing counsel from Earl Ryan at the 
hearing of third-party plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and approxi-
mately 2 1/2 years after Christopher Ryan's affidavit, does not raise any 
factual issues precluding resolution of the matter by summary judgment for 
the following reasons: First, Mr. Earl Ryan was in attendance at the taking 
of his son's sworn statement and made no comment, correction or objection 
when his son stated that he had permission to take the car for the evening; 
and second, Mr. Earl Ryan does not deny in his affidavit that he gave permis-
sion to his son Christopher to use the car. 
Even if the affidavit of Earl Ryan raised a genuine issue as to any 
fact material to the court's decision, which it does not, consideration of the 
affidavit is precluded by Rule 56(c), which requires that opposing affidavits 
be served prior to the date of hearing. 
The law, as capably outlined in Judge Croft's memorandum decision 
is clear that if Christopher Ryan was given permission to fruse" the car and 
if, at the time of the accident Christopher Ryan was in the car or the car was 
being driven for some purpose or benefit of Christopher Ryan, the car was 
being "used" by him within the meaning of the "omnibus" clause and coverage 
would extend to the driver, in this case Benjamin Ryan. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the arguments and authorities as cited herein, respondent 
- 9 -
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respectfully requests the court to affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WILLIAM J. CAY IAS 
Attorney for Third-Party Plaintiff 
1558 South 1100 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
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